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Shimomura Kôtarô (1863-1937) and the Circulation  
of Technical Knowledge between the United States,  
Japan, and Belgium 1
Aleksandra Kobiljski
Sometime in 1873, in an innovative domain school in northern Kyûshû, one 
young student, Shimomura Kôtarô (1863-1937), placed a tree leaf in his desk 
drawer and started reading the Gospel of Matthew. 2 His hope was that in so 
doing he would be able to induce the leaf’s transformation into gold. Recounted 
in his autobiographical writings many years later, this episode is more than a 
negligible example of simple childhood reverie. In fact, it is a hallmark of 
Shimomura’s career as a chemical engineer whose life’s work seemed to his 
European colleagues equally impossible: turning highly bituminous Japanese 
coal (40% volatile matter on average) into anthracite-grade coal (around 10% 
volatile matter). 3
The present article, which examines the itinerary and work of this chemist 
and engineer, is a product of the conluence of two lines of inquiry: an 
investigation into innovation in coking technology and its role in the emergence 
1. This article would have been impossible without the generous help of the staff at the 
Dôshisha University Archive (Kyoto, Japan), especially Tomoko Fuse, who shared 
my passion for opening dusty boxes, odd-sized blueprints, and unwieldy rolls of 
correspondence. I am grateful to Muneharu Kitagaki, Asako Matsuki, Catherine 
Jami, Delphine Spicq, Antonella Romano, Annick Guénel, Nicolas Coupain, and two 
anonymous reviewers for helpful and stimulating comments on an earlier version of this 
article. The research was supported by a fellowship from Harvard University (USA), 
the ANR (France) grant ICCM ANR-09-SSOC-004, and the D. Kim Foundation for 
the History of Science and Technology in East Asia (USA). The Needham Research 
Institute has provided an intellectual home for the inal corrections of the article.
2. All Japanese names in this article are listed in their customary order in which surname 
precedes the given name.
3. English-language studies on Shimomura Kôtarô are non-existent and those in Japanese 
are scarce. See Shimao 1975: 4-10, Shimao 1991: 197-210, and Shimao 2002: 102-
109.
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of modern steel industry in Japan on the one hand and an investigation into the 
impact of human mobility on the circulation of scientiic and technological 
knowledge on the other. The irst is inspired by the author’s personal research 
in progress and based in large part on the private archives of a key igure in the 
early history of byproduct coking in Japan. The other is inspired by the author’s 
participation in a collective research project focusing on the role of individual 
mobility in the circulation of scientiic and technical knowledge in China. 4 
This article focuses on Shimomura’s itinerary between Japan the United States 
and Europe as well as within Japan itself in pursuit of the scientiic knowledge 
and technical expertise he would put to use in developing a particular coking 
protocol.
Shimomura’s itinerary is that of an engineer whose atypical career path 
has resulted in his historiographical marginalization. This is, irst, the result 
of his educational background. In his seminal work, Foundation of Science in 
Japan: Building a Research Tradition, James Bartholomew discusses the work 
and career of a number of Japanese scientists over a period of four decades. 
All of them were either graduates or students of the Imperial University of 
Tokyo. In a recent article on the struggle of engineers to improve their social 
status, Erich Pauer discusses a number of Japanese engineers in the irst half of 
the twentieth century, all of whom were also Imperial University graduates. 5 
Shimomura, however, was educated at a small, American-staffed Protestant 
college in Kyoto, entirely outside of and partially at odds with the Imperial 
University’s network. Second, he was one of only a handful of Japanese 
scientists who had a lasting connection with the Christian faith. Converting 
at the age of twelve, he grew to see his faith as a continuation of his scientiic 
pursuit to understand the universe, not as opposed to it. 6 Third, he was a 
chemist trained in the United States, and not, as was the norm at the time in 
Germany. Consequently, in building his professional and personal networks, 
he gravitated towards New England rather than Germany. Finally, his career 
included an uncommon switch from academia to the world of industry, as he 
went from being a chemistry teacher to a chemical engineer.
Although he worked on the margins of the scientiic and industrial 
landscape of his time, Shimomura left his mark on both. Perhaps paradoxically, 
his contribution was both made possible and obscured by the singularity of his 
4. ICCM (Itinéraires individuels et circulation des savoirs scientiiques et techniques en 
Chine moderne, xvie-xxe siècle) ANR-09-SSOC-004.
5. Pauer 2013.
6. For an introduction to Shimomura’s ideas on faith and science, see Kobiljski 2014 
(forthcoming).
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impact of human mobility on the circulation of scientiic and technological 
knowledge on the other. The irst is inspired by the author’s personal research 
in progress and based in large part on the private archives of a key igure in the 
mobility in the circulation of scientiic and technical knowledge in China.
and Europe as well as within Japan itself in pursuit of the scientiic knowledge 
has resulted in his historiographical marginalization. This is, irst, the result 
status, Erich Pauer discusses a number of Japanese engineers in the irst half of 
at the age of twelve, he grew to see his faith as a continuation of his scientiic 
Although he worked on the margins of the scientiic and industrial 
4. ICCM (Itinéraires individuels et circulation des savoirs scientiiques et techniques en 
intellectual path within the context of the emerging scientiic and industrial 
establishment. His education, outside the dominant networks, enabled him 
to effectively question received wisdom on what is done or possible. By 
questioning the limits of the possible or practical, he was able to produce locally 
the kind of fuel without which the nascent Japanese steel industry would have 
come to a standstill in the early 1900s. This success was further facilitated 
by the fact that he worked in a relatively small private company, where his 
technical decisions were not under the scrutiny of a host of bureaucrats, as 
was common in state-run enterprises. At the same time, his positioning on 
the margins of both state academic institutions and major military-industrial 
venues throughout his career made his contribution to putting in place Yawata 
Steel Works’coking plant possible. 7 He was neither a Tokyo alumnus nor had 
he studied in Germany; he was not an employee but merely a consultant at 
Yawata. As such, he has been almost completely excluded from most accounts 
of Yawata’s early years and subsequent accounts of coking innovation at the 
company in favor of a later generation of Yawata coke experts, such as Kuroda 
Taizô (1883-1961), whom he helped train.
Finally, as a study of a individual itinerary, this analysis—as well the 
project within which it developed—is anchored to a greater or lesser degree in 
biographical study. In the eyes of many historians of science and technology, 
biography—understood to mean history of great men and their inventions—
has long been a marginalized genre in academic if not trade publishing. The 
recent revival of interest in the utility of biography (and biographical data) 
for historical inquiry has been coupled with a rethinking of the biographical 
method, which developed in parallel in history and sociology. In its initial 
incarnation, it came largely from scholars working on European and North 
American societies. Nevertheless, some of the most innovative uses of 
biographical data have emerged in other modern historiographies—for 
example in the history of the late Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) or of Qing 
China (1644-1911). 8 These works rely on culling information from relatively 
large data pools, such as local gazetteers in China (difang zhi) or career records 
of Ottoman bureaucrats found in the Register of the conditions [of state 
employees] (Sicill-i Ahval Defterleri), which contains over 50,000 personnel 
records. As such, they rely on new technology that allows the manipulation 
of data sets following a clear deinition of parameters used in collection and 
analysis. Methodologically, such biographical studies make a strong case for a 
7. See the extended discussion the Yawata Steel Works below.




reasoned use of hitherto neglected sources of biographical data. Analytically, 
they offer what the French sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron calls “a degree 
of aggregation of synchronic properties,” 9 whether this be a collective portrait 
of social or professional groups, such as Chinese medical experts from the far 
south, demoted Tibetan oficials, or promoted Ottoman bureaucrats.
This article is inspired by these works and beneits from their methodological 
relections, although its analytical goal is slightly different. Rather than use 
biographical data to aim at a collective portrait, I use a single man’s biographical 
sketch as a springboard into two questions of broad import for the study of 
the history of technology in Meiji Japan (1868-1912). First, Shimomura’s 
individual itinerary and professional career are dificult to it into currently 
existing typologies of the nascent and consequently luid category of engineer 
in Meiji Japan. Thus the present article hopefully makes a contribution towards 
nuance in our understanding of where Meiji engineers came from in terms of 
educational background and professional paths. 10 Second, it contributes to the 
literature on the role of small and medium companies in Japan’s modernization 
drive.
Because of its exceptional character, Shimomura’s career needs to be 
analyzed while keeping in mind the question of the relevance of an individual, 
non-representative case for historical inquiry. These issues have been raised 
in the context of two decades of debates about the scale of historical analysis, 
notably within the context of micro-history. As one among several critical 
trends of the 1980s and 1990s, micro-history represents a reaction to macro-
historical approaches that, in many different forms, dominated historiography. 
At its core lies an effort to make visible individual historical actors and their 
experiences of large-scale social and historical processes. Methodologically, it 
decoupled the notion of scale and importance, and, in a relatively short span 
of time, it helped revise axioms on the construction of historical subject. For 
example, it is not widely accepted that the process of industrialization was not 
simply a capital-labor-technology macro dynamic but needs to be understood 
in terms of the experiences of individuals and the logic that guided their 
choices and paths. 11 In outlining Shimomura’s career, this article does not aim 
to “give the microphone to an ant,” as critics may suggest, but rather use an 
9. Passeron 1990: 6.
10. For a classic examination of the industrialization of Japan from the perspective of the 
history of technology, with special emphasis on technological innovation and its actors, 
see Nakaoka 2006. For a recent study of technical education and professionalization, 
see Sawai 2012.
11. Revel 1996: 7-36.
Shimomura was born in 1863, the irst son and the heir of a low-ranking 
of the Higo domain, the ifth largest domain in Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868), 
was oficially taxed at 540,000 bales of rice or 
 was an oficial measure of volume, 
oficially an outside or 
the largest but also the most inluential outside domains, known for its staunch 
leadership had to ind a way to change its oficial ideological orientation, 
buttressed feudal Japan. This meant a struggle against the domain’s oficial 
opposition igures, literati loosely gathered around the Practical Learning 
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south, demoted Tibetan oficials, or promoted Ottoman bureaucrats.
This article is inspired by these works and beneits from their methodological 
relections, although its analytical goal is slightly different. Rather than use 
individual itinerary and professional career are dificult to it into currently 
existing typologies of the nascent and consequently luid category of engineer 
ant—Shimomura Kôtarô—to ask questions and generate hypotheses about a 
certain segment of the anthill’s history—the industrialization of Japan in the 
Meiji period (1868-1912) and its actors.
The making of a chemist (1872-1895): Kumamoto to Kyoto
Shimomura was born in 1863, the irst son and the heir of a low-ranking 
samurai family in Kumamoto, on the island of Kyûshû. Kumamoto, the capital 
of the Higo domain, the ifth largest domain in Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868), 
was oficially taxed at 540,000 bales of rice or koku but with an actual annual 
income of some 720,000 koku (a koku was an oficial measure of volume, 
and in Edo, the capital, 1 koku was approximately 278.3 liters). Although 
oficially an outside or tozama domain and thus barred from the Tokugawa 
government’s inner administrative circle, Higo had established close ties to the 
Shogunate. By the later part of the Tokugawa period, it was one of not only 
the largest but also the most inluential outside domains, known for its staunch 
conservatism. Although, at least since the 1850s, both the signs of weakness 
in the Shogunate and the need to end Japan’s seclusion were evident, the Higo 
leadership was unable to respond to the growing sense of crisis in any way 
other than to uphold the existing order. Thus, Higo’s conservatism effectively 
prevented it from participating in the reform movement driving the Restoration 
in the 1850s and 1860s. It was Higo’s neighboring domains—the Satsuma to 
the south, Hizen to the north, and the nearby Chôshû and Tosa—that took the 
intellectual and military initiative in the movement that would become known 
as the 1868 Meiji Restoration. By 1870, having risked and invested in the 
uncertain project of regime change, those domains were reaping the dividends 
of the transition while Higo was being bypassed.
If Higo was not to be left behind by the “new” Japan, the domain’s 
leadership had to ind a way to change its oficial ideological orientation, 
which rested on a particular interpretation of Neo-Confucianism that had 
buttressed feudal Japan. This meant a struggle against the domain’s oficial 
academy—the Jishûkan, the bastion of this orthodoxy—and an entrenched 
group of political actors gathered under the banner of the so-called School 
Party (Gakkotô), which had run Kumamoto politics before and was still a force 
in the aftermath of the 1868 Restoration.
The job of reforming the intellectual heart of the domain fell to long-time 
opposition igures, literati loosely gathered around the Practical Learning 
Party (Jitsugakutô), which centered on Yokoi Shônan (1809-1869) and his 
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students. 12 During the 1840s and 1850s, Yokoi taught in his private academy 
in Kumamoto and attracted students from two social groups: lower-ranking 
samurai youth and the sons of wealthy peasants. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
the latter group had grown rich and saw economic and social opportunities in 
the changes taking place in the late Tokugawa period. Aspiring to buy their 
way into the status of low-ranking samurai, they shared with them a keen 
interest in and concern for practicality. While for the low-ranking samurai this 
was a matter of survival amid rising inlation and diminishing stipends, for 
wealthy peasants it was a question of maximizing their economic well-being.
In 1863 (the year of Shimomura’s birth), Yokoi was placed under house 
arrest outside Kumamoto and stripped of his stipend. The immediate cause 
was the circulation of his seminal tract on three issues in state policy, the 
Kokuzen sanron, which would later serve as one of the foundation texts of 
early Meiji statecraft.  13 Yokoi was released ive years later, in the aftermath of 
the Restoration, and left Kumamoto for Kyoto, where he advised the emperor 
on the reform that he had spent decades advocating. Only months after his 
release, he was assassinated in Kyoto by a group of lordless samurai (rônin) 
who were opponents of the Restoration.
Although he was an important architect of the movement that brought 
about the Restoration, Yokoi did not live to see the implementation of reforms 
he helped engineer. But his legacy was felt in some of the most important 
documents of the Meiji Restoration; one of his students wrote his ideas into 
the Charter Oath, a document that outlined the Restoration’s aims promulgated 
on April 7, 1868. To Shimomura, who was ive years old at the time, Yokoi’s 
posthumous reputation as a proto-architect of the Restoration may not have 
meant much had it not had another, very local, incarnation. Yokoi’s teaching 
became the foundation of a plan drawn two years after his assassination to 
establish a school that was to become Shimomura’s irst training ground, the 
Kumamoto School of Western Learning. 14 In 1870, as the tide of change was 
rising, two of Yokoi’s students—Tokutomi Ikkei (1822-1914) and Takezaki 
Sadô (1812-1877)—and a number of their supporters seized the opportunity to 
12. Discussion of Yokoi’s ideas in English can be found in Harootunian 1970. For an 
English translation of Shonan’s Kokuze sanron, his seminal 1860 tract, see Miyauchi 
1968.
13. Strictly speaking, the Kokuze sanron was written down by one of Yokoi’s students 
during his stay in Fukui domain where he was invited by its lord Matsudaira Shungaku 
(1828-1890) to teach. Therefore, it consists of a text based on lecture notes followed 
by questions and answers.
14. For Yokoi’s legacy in the Kumamoto School of Western Learning, I used a classic 
biography of Yokoi in Japanese; see Yamazaki 1938. See also Notehelfer 1985.
depose the conservative oficials in power. Their offensive began with a reform 
sweeping administrative and iscal reforms. Echoing Yokoi’s considerable 
school an important part of the reform agenda. The return of Lord Hosokawa 
The newly founded Kumamoto School for Western Learning, the Kumamoto 
War veteran, Captain Leroy Lansing Janes (1837-1909).
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was a matter of survival amid rising inlation and diminishing stipends, for 
 Yokoi was released ive years later, in the aftermath of 
on April 7, 1868. To Shimomura, who was ive years old at the time, Yokoi’s 
establish a school that was to become Shimomura’s irst training ground, the 
Kumamoto School of Western Learning.
 For Yokoi’s legacy in the Kumamoto School of Western Learning, I used a classic 
depose the conservative oficials in power. Their offensive began with a reform 
initiative: a call on Higo’s domain lord to return from Tokyo and undertake 
sweeping administrative and iscal reforms. Echoing Yokoi’s considerable 
concern with educational reform and his insistence on the opening of Japan 
to the outside world and education, they made establishing of a new kind of 
school an important part of the reform agenda. The return of Lord Hosokawa 
to Kumamoto in May, 1870, marked the implementation of this plan and led to 
what was to be called the Higo Restoration.
The newly founded Kumamoto School for Western Learning, the Kumamoto 
yôgakko, had the task of combining Japan’s Confucian ethics with Western 
science and technology, most importantly those elements that could help prop 
up Japan’s military apparatus and devise new defense strategies. For that 
purpose, the founders developed a school and a curriculum divided between 
the study of Confucian classics on the one hand and what they called Western 
learning (yôgaku), a mix of English language, geography, history, literature, 
and a science curriculum that included chemistry, physics, astronomy, and 
mathematics. To take charge of the “Western” part of this curriculum, in 1871 
the Kumamoto domain arranged to hire a West Point graduate and US Civil 
War veteran, Captain Leroy Lansing Janes (1837-1909). 15 His teaching was 
an indispensable ingredient of a policy intended to immunize Japan from 
weakness. By hiring an American military man, the Kumamoto proponents of 
practical learning sought to follow a well-known belief of the day: that there 
could be no better combination than that of Japanese spirituality with Western 
technology. Yokoi was an early proponent of the policy, which by 1870 had 
become one of the early Meiji period’s slogans: “Japanese spirit and Western 
technology,” or Wakon yôsai. 16 However, Janes’task was neither pedagogically 
simple nor socially without its challenges. It meant teaching students who 
spoke no English while living with his wife well outside the treaty ports, a life 
15. For an English-language account of Janes’stay in Japan, see Janes 1970. For a synthetic 
historical account of Janes’teaching years in Japan, see Notehelfer 1985: 130-178. For 
a Japanese-language account of the experience of his students in his classroom see, for 
example, Ebina, 1935.
16. This was a Meiji version of a late-Tokugawa period slogan Tôyô no dôtoku, seiyô 
no gakugei or “Eastern ethics and Western Science” popularized by Sakuma Shôzan 
(1811-1864). Although reformulated and widely used in the early Meiji period, this 
slogan was used well into the twentieth century. See, among others, Mizuno, 2008: 57.
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isolated in the Japanese interior. He spoke no Japanese, and it is not clear to 
what point any of his hosts had a functional command of English. 17
These were turbulent times, since the school had opened its doors only 
four years after the emperor was brought or “restored” to power and Japan 
embarked on what seemed a path of unprecedented changes. In 1872, when the 
school was in its second year and Shimomura enrolled, the central government 
announced the abolition of hereditary stipends for samurai families. For 
Shimomura, the opportunity to attend the school was an exciting encounter 
with the basics of the science curriculum as it was taught to children of his 
age in the United States. He was nine years old, four years younger than the 
average student in the class, and for him, as for many of his peers, Janes was 
the irst foreigner he had ever seen. At the same time, the scholarship to attend 
the Kumamoto School for Western Learning gave him a chance to receive an 
education that could help a youngster designated as his family’s heir weather 
a profound social crisis.
In pursuit of a mixture of Western learning and Japanese spirit, the 
students’days at the Kumamoto’s yôgakko were divided in two parts: instruction 
in English language, physics, astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, geography, 
and military drill on the one hand, and a Confucian Classics curriculum of 
reading, reciting, and composition in Classical Chinese on the other. However, 
the mission of grafting modern science onto a basis of Confucian ethics did 
not proceed as smoothly as planned. Early in the school year, Captain Janes 
and Takezaki sensei, the school’s famous Confucian scholar, found themselves 
in a position of rivalry. 18 It did not help that they knew little about each 
other and were prejudiced toward each other’s world view. Takezaki and 
other Japanese teachers referred to Christianity in derogatory terms. 19 Janes 
17. Details on the tasks of the school and desired qualiications of the foreign teachers to 
be hired at the Kumamoto School of Western Learning are outlined in Higo han kokuji 
shiryô 1932: 691-3.
18. Sensei is a noun designating a teacher, a professor, or in certain cases religious 
dignitaries and is obligatorily used to address them or refer to them.
19. This was not surprising in view of the oficial governmental ban on Christianity in 
Japan that was still in effect when Janes arrived in 1871 and in light of Kumamoto’s 
staunch anti-Christian atmosphere, which persisted even after the ban was lifted in 
1872. Although liberal on the question of opening Japan to the world, even proponents 
of practical learning were anti-Christian. In his autobiography, Shimomura recalls the 
school principal using the term kirisutan bateren, more commonly given as kirishitan 
bateren, a derogatory designation for Christianity in the Tokugawa period. Some of the 
students used the same designation. The word bateren comes from the Portuguese for 
a Catholic priest, padre. See Shimomura 1931: 6, 10.
books”—probably not realizing that much of what he was coniscating were 
Western civilization and technological progress. Although, for the irst four 
For many Kumamoto students of the irst generation, the school experience 
When Shimomura’s American teacher irst arrived in Kumamoto, he 
a version of Protestant values onto a late Edo – period inlection of Neo-Confucian 
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the irst foreigner he had ever seen. At the same time, the scholarship to attend 
the Kumamoto School for Western Learning gave him a chance to receive an 
 Details on the tasks of the school and desired qualiications of the foreign teachers to 
be hired at the Kumamoto School of Western Learning are outlined in
 This was not surprising in view of the oficial governmental ban on Christianity in 
went into the dormitory rooms of his students and snatched their “Chinese 
books”—probably not realizing that much of what he was coniscating were 
not Confucian Classics but adventure novels. 20 Regardless of their level of (in) 
comprehension, Janes spoke only English to his students and seems not to have 
learned more than a few words of Japanese. He pursued the English section of 
the curriculum as if the Confucian section did not exist; the same was true of 
his Japanese counterparts. At the heart of the matter lay two different visions 
of the place of science and technology in a modernizing society. Jitsugaku 
(practical learning) scholars argued it was possible (and necessary) to cherry-
pick elements of an intellectual tradition, in this case a science curriculum 
and military tactics, and mix them with a curriculum based on Neo-Confucian 
precepts. On the other hand, Captain Janes—like many of his Protestant 
missionary contemporaries—believed that Christianity was at the core of 
Western civilization and technological progress. Although, for the irst four 
years of teaching, Janes did not spell out his views, in his mind it followed 
that importing Western technology was futile if not accompanied by its ethical 
source: Christian morality and faith. 21
For many Kumamoto students of the irst generation, the school experience 
was a rather destabilizing one. The pedagogy behind the experiment seemed to 
imply that the mixture of Confucian ethics and Western science was to materialize 
not in discussions between the teachers but in the minds of the students. In 
other words, the main work of harmonizing two intellectual perspectives and 
of actually grafting one onto the other was left to the Kumamoto domain’s 
brightest teenagers. This was no small responsibility, as the combination was 
perceived to be the key to their country’s self-strengthening and modernization 
project. 22
When Shimomura’s American teacher irst arrived in Kumamoto, he 
brought with him a vision of a Christian as a radical reformer in the service 
of his community. For many boys in his class, becoming leading reformers 
of their society, being a moral example, and using science and technology to 
improve the lives of those around was exactly what they aspired to. What Janes 
20. Ibid.: 8-9.
21. For an analysis of the different shades of Janes’Christianity and how it changed during 
his Kumamoto years, see Notehelfer 1985: 179-209.
22. Even the Kumamoto students’later embrace of Christianity did not entail a complete 
rejection of Confucianism. Rather, it marked the beginning of another stage of grafting 
a version of Protestant values onto a late Edo – period inlection of Neo-Confucian 
ethics that was characteristic of early Meiji Christians. For an analysis of one of 




believed and was teaching his students without saying so explicitly was that 
this kind of service to the community was in itself a form of prayer. Without 
confronting them with the Bible but by teaching about science, technology, 
and nature, Janes was preaching God’s “other book.” In the words of one of 
his students, this was a kind of preaching that did not require words. 23 As time 
went by and, in part, due to his social isolation in Kumamoto, Janes turned to 
faith and experienced a personal renewal. 24 With his new-born faith came a 
conviction that learning astronomy, botany, and English could not strengthen 
Japan if his boys did not understand Christianity, the ostensible core of the 
civilized ways his students were trying to penetrate. Very few Japanese at the 
time and not many foreigners other than the missionaries subscribed to the 
idea that Japan had to Christianize to be counted among the civilized nations. 
Lafcadio Hearn, a long-time American resident of Japan, illustrated the 
sentiment when he wrote that “Japan has nothing to gain by Christianity.” 25 Yet 
Janes came to Kumamoto in early 1871 believing that there was a direct link 
between Western progress and its Christian ethos, and he came to be a living 
example of it in and out of the classroom. 26
His educational philosophy aside, upon his arrival Janes had to concentrate 
most of his energies on overcoming the language barrier which is why the 
irst year of study was devoted to intensive learning of English, military drills, 
and the basics of Western-style arithmetic or yôsan. 27 As soon as they could 
communicate in English, some of the older students challenged Janes’vision 
by reciting arguments for Confucian superiority over Christianity.  28 Although 
by this time the second half of the popular late Tokugawa period (1600-1868) 
slogan “revere the Emperor and repel the barbarians” (sonno jôi) had been 
quietly dropped from political discourse, many of his students grew up with 
23. As cited in Notehelfer 1985: 181, from the now apparently lost Fukunaga 1893: 82.
24. Some mission historians have subsequently suggested that Janes was sent by a 
missionary organization; see Andersen 1999: 327. The attempts to claim him as a 
missionary are grossly inaccurate. After being dismissed from his teaching position 
in Kumamoto, when Janes wanted to become a missionary, the American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) rejected the idea, despite the 
unanimous support of their missionaries stationed in Japan. See Notehelfer 1985: 210-
217.
25. Hearn to Chamberlain, January 19, 1893, in Hearn 1922: vol. 15, 359.
26. Notehlefer 1985: 192.
27. On the Japanese mathematics tradition referred to as wasan, see Horiuchi 2010: esp. 
xix-xxvii, on the scope of the term.
28. Kozaki 1933: 35-36.
Before entering Kumamoto School for Western Learning, Shimomura spent 
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Lafcadio Hearn, a long-time American resident of Japan, illustrated the 
irst year of study was devoted to intensive learning of English, military drills, 
the image of Westerners as barbarians. 29 However, with time, the intensity of 
the contact between the students and their American teacher, coupled with 
Janes’enthusiasm for his students and passion for teaching worked to chip away 
the layers of his students’cultural discomfort with and intellectual prejudice 
against foreigners. The more they got to know Janes, the more he looked like 
an American version of a samurai. 30 This made them more attentive to his 
message. And thus, students and teacher changed each other’s lives.
The boy who wanted to go to the moon
In the winter 1875, Janes started organizing weekly Bible study meetings 
at his home for interested students. Usually these sessions started with prayer 
by him, continued with Bible reading and discussion, and closed with hymn 
singing. The word soon spread around the school that Janes was talking 
about magical things, possibly a misinterpretation of Janes’explanations of 
Jesus’miracles such as walking on water, curing the sick, and feeding the 
hungry. While Janes meant this as proof of Jesus’credentials as the Son of 
God, at least some of his students understood it to be a story of a powerful 
Western sorcerer with tricks up his sleeve. Shimomura was one of these. 
Before entering Kumamoto School for Western Learning, Shimomura spent 
hours reading Takizawa Bakin’s magic-infused The Eight Dog Chronicle 
(Hakkenden), a serialized novel from the late Tokugawa period (1600-1868) 
which remained popular well into the nineteenth century. Reading it stimulated 
the child Shimomura’s interest in mastering the magic that made the adventures 
and transformations described in the novel possible. A little later, during his 
Kumamoto school days, a fellow student suggested reading and gave him a 
copy of “a Christian book” (kirishitan bateren hon) that could help him learn 
about Western alchemy and magic. 31 Both boys were interested in magic, and 
one of Shimomura’s projects was to try to turn an ordinary tree leaf into a 
golden one by stashing it in a desk drawer and reading the Bible. 32 Although 
29. Following common practice, I translate the late Tokugawa period slogan sonno jôi as 
“Revere the emperor and repel the barbarians.” Jôi is ocasionally translated as “expel 
foreigners” because the more neutral “foreigner” better suits contemporary sensibilities 
of political correctness. I use the term “barbarian” because it conveys the sensibility of 
the period.
30. Notehelfer 1985: 104, 149.
31. Its virtually impossible to identify precisely which book it was.
32. Shimomura 1931: 6.
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his attempts failed, young Shimomura continued searching. A reading of the 
Gospel of Matthew—where the miracle of the seven loaves and ishes is 
described—conirmed his understanding of Jesus as a master of magic tricks. 33
After his attempt to turn a leaf into gold, Shimomura’s interest in 
astronomy brought about a new fascination with going to the Moon, which 
led him to his irst prayer meeting. Following the contemporary logic of belief 
in the superiority of Western science, it was a small step for eleven-year-old 
Shimomura to assume the superiority of Western magic and sorcery over its 
Japanese counterpart. From the students’viewpoint, Janes spoke of magic (the 
Second Coming of Christ, Jesus’return to the Earth) and supernatural acts 
(Jesus’miracles). During the meetings, Janes, like Jesus before performing the 
miracle of the loaves and ishes, often looked up to the sky when offering 
prayers and giving thanks. Thus, Shimomura had reason to believe “that the 
study of Christianity enables one to learn the way of going to the Moon” and 
that Janes could help with that. 34 Teach about Christianity he did, although not 
in the manner that Shimomura expected.
In February 1876, during his ifth year at Kumamoto, Janes led a group 
of 40 (out of an estimated 200) students to a nearby hill where they read a 
Covenant, a document deining their conversion to Protestant Christianity. 35 
While school authorities expected them to add Western science and technology 
to their Confucian education, the boys had become convinced that that “there is 
a chain connection between Christianity and Western learning.” 36 Embracing 
Christianity seemed a way of fulilling their Confucian duty to their teacher, 
the school’s mission, and their country’s future. But their parents and the 
school administration disagreed. Janes was dismissed, while his students faced 
various degrees of family wrath. Some spent weeks in coninement, some 
were even deprived of water and food for days. Shimomura was an exception; 
during the interrogation that followed he could calmly say that he obtained 
his father’s permission to become a Christian, leaving the school’s principal, 
certain professor Morita, at a loss for words. 37
A few months later, before leaving Japan, Janes secured the admission of 
all forty of his protégés to Dôshisha, a newly founded Protestant college in 
33. Shimomura refers to a woodblock-print edition of the Gospel of Matthew, which was 
likely Hepburn’s translation, printed in 1873; see Cohen 2013: 30-41.
34. Kiristosha retsuden: shinkô sanjûnen 1921: 56.
35. My estimate is based on a register of students transcribed by an unknown author and 
found in the Kumamoto Prefectural Library, Archive section, call no. 0112610.
36. Shimomura 1931: 7.
37. Shimomura 1931: 8.
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Kyoto, which enabled them to escape further persecution in Kumamoto. There, 
Shimomura continued his education under two tutors: an American, Jerome 
Davis, graduate of Beloit College (in the US state of Wisconsin) and Niijima 
Jô (1843-1890), a Christian convert and a graduate of Amherst College and 
Andover Theological Seminary (both in Massachusetts), at whose initiative 
Dôshisha was established in 1875. Shimomura spent most of his time studying 
scientiic subjects sandwiched between morning and evening prayer, with 
weekly Bible study on the Sabbath. After the loss of his stipend, Shimomura’s 
father had started an agricultural venture, but his death in 1876 left Shimomura 
responsible for supporting the family. After graduation in 1879, Shimomura 
briely returned to Kumamoto before being called back to teach at Dôshisha; 
he then settled in Kyoto with his mother and sisters.
During his irst round as a teacher at Dôshisha, from 1882 to 1885, like 
his other colleagues, Shimomura taught a wide variety of subjects, including 
natural philosophy, physics, astronomy and geology, reading and spelling 
(English), rhetoric (Japanese), history of civilization, history of the United 
States, arithmetic, and algebra. Yet he gradually started specializing in 
teaching mostly physics, chemistry, and mathematics, and by 1885 the college 
prospectus lists him as a designated teacher of these three subjects. 38
His students described him as a dedicated teacher, “a profound thinker” and 
not dogmatic. 39 “Sensei was the kind of man,” one student remembered, “who 
would clearly say ‘I don’t know’when he didn’t and ‘I don’t understand’when 
he didn’t.” 40 To those students who asked, he would give additional help and 
lessons, becoming one of busiest teachers in the college. 41 Perhaps the most 
remarkable aspect of Shimomura’s irst teaching period was the breadth of 
mind with which he mentored his students. As revealed in a diary of one of his 
students, to those students who sought advice on how to prepare for Christian 
work, he recommended not the study of the Bible, but that of politics and 
economics. “Looking at the current situation of the country,” Shimomura told 
them “for the next forty or ifty years, I urge you to pay attention to politics. 
If you don’t know everything about it, you will get laughed at and surely sully 
38. Dôshisha circular 1885. Faculty records for 1882/3 and 1883/4 show that his teaching 
load was very varied. See Dôshisha Faculty Records 1879-1895 (2004): 36-55. The 
mention of Shimomura teaching Japanese rhetoric is from Abe Isoo’s diary entry for 
January 10, 1884. See Abe 2009: 74.
39. Sôritsuki no Dôshisha: sotsugyôseitachi no kaisorokoku 1986: 26.
40. Ibid.
41. Abe diary entry for September 28, 1883, reads: “At 4 p.m., went to Mr. Shimomura’s 
house to take the exam in the History of Western Civilization.” See Abe 2009: 66.
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the reputation of Christianity.” 42 When abandoning traditions was the slogan 
of the day and in the middle of the Meiji government’s campaign against 
the Buddhist establishment, Shimomura urged his students with evangelistic 
ambitions to study the Confucian classics and the basic tenets of Buddhism. 43 
Finally, he urged them to worry not only about ideas but also about the practical 
challenges of building a country while keeping in mind that Japan “is different 
from other countries in terms of how things are done.” 44
From Japan to the United States and back
Around the time he became Dôshisha’s principal teacher of physics 
and chemistry, Shimomura started thinking intensively about going abroad 
for further study. Consistent with the advice he was giving his students 
about learning about the world around them in order to be of good service 
to Christianity, he too wished to become a better scientist and thus a better 
advocate for Christianity in Japan. Believing that “whether politically or 
morally, Christianity alone can save Japan,” he proceeded to deine the 
“the lack of Christian scientists” 45 as the greatest need of the moment and 
the biggest obstacle in this struggle. 46 By 1884, Shimomura was eager to go 
abroad for further scientiic study. “The idea of going to the West has occupied 
my mind for the last ive years,” he wrote (in English) to Dôshisha’s president 
and his mentor Niijima, “and now my heart burns. I pray for the opening of the 
way. I feel my future usefulness depends upon it.” 47
The irst step on his way to the United States was overcoming the 
reluctance of the American missionaries at Dôshisha, whose approval and 
connections were essential for the realization of his plan. In the late summer 
of 1885, he sailed for the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) in Worcester, 
Massachusetts. Once there, Shimomura found that he was behind in his 
“knowledge of technical and scientiic terms” and decided he was “not fond of 
mathematics.” However, in the words of WPI’s director about his irst Japanese 
42. Abe diary entry for August 5, 1884; see Abe 2009: 68-69.
43. For a self-deinition of their aspiration to be men of education, see Shimomura Kôtarô, 
The Aim of My Life.
44. Abe diary entry for August 5, 1884; see Abe 2009: 68-69.
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abroad for further scientiic study. “The idea of going to the West has occupied 
my mind for the last ive years,” he wrote (in English) to Dôshisha’s president 
The irst step on his way to the United States was overcoming the 
“knowledge of technical and scientiic terms” and decided he was “not fond of 
mathematics.” However, in the words of WPI’s director about his irst Japanese 
 For a self-deinition of their aspiration to be men of education, see Shimomura Kôtarô, 
student, Shimomura “applied himself so diligently that he soon took high rank 
in one of the best classes the [Worcester] ‘Tech’ever had,” and in the year of 
his graduation he was voted the smartest person of the class of 1888. 48
In 1888, Shimomura obtained his Bachelor of Science (BS) degree with a 
thesis on theories of the formation of chemical elements, graduating second in 
his class. Instead of returning to Japan and reassuming his teaching position, 
as his family and colleagues expected, Shimomura decided to enroll in a PhD 
program in chemistry at Johns Hopkins University so as to “broaden [his] 
knowledge of Chemistry.” 49 He went to study with Ira Remsen (1846-1927), 
the founder of the American Chemical Journal, one of the original faculty 
members at the Johns Hopkins University and the head of the laboratory that 
discovered saccharin. 50 A year later, in 1889, he obtained a PhD degree in 
chemistry, in a short period not uncommon at the time. He again delayed his 
return for the purpose of fundraising for Dôshisha’s new School of Science. “I 
believe,” he wrote, “one who does to the school the greatest good […] is he 
who helps to put [it] in a irm inancial condition and not he who comes back 
glittering with his degrees […] to sit down in an easy professor’s chair.” 51 
Thanks to the introductions of friends, missionaries, and acquaintances, he 
had the good fortune of meeting Jonathan Newton Harris, a New London, 
Connecticut, entrepreneur. 52 Shimomura’s science background combined with 
his faith seems to have deeply impressed Harris, who consequently decided 
to give him a $100,000 endowment with additional smaller sums for special 
purposes (including $10,000 for erecting a specialized building with an 
observatory, $8,000 for laboratory equipment, books, and Shimomura’s travel 
expenses). 53 The interest from the endowment was intended to fund a new 
department for scientiic work at Dôshisha, and the Harris School of Science 
opened in September 1890, the irst of its kind at a private college in Japan.
To the great pleasure of both its principal benefactor and Shimomura 
himself, the Harris School of Science was a temple of science on a Protestant 
college campus, a living argument for the unity of religion and science. 54 What 
48. Homer T. Fuller, “Kotaro M. Shimomura,” The Journal of the Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute 7 (1903-1904): 312; The Log, 64 (Worcester Polytechnic Institute Archive).
49. The Ferdinand Hamburger Archives of The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 
Maryland; Record Group 13.010, subgroup 1, series 2 [Kotaro Shimomura].
50. Warner 2008.
51. Shimomura to Niijima. April 15, 1888. See Nijiima Jô eibun shomotsu 2007: 605.
52. Ibid.: 646.
53. Dôshisha hyakunenshi vol.1. 1979: 373; Shimomura to Niijima, May 20, 1889, Nijiima 
Jô eibun shomotsu 2007: 695; August 25, 1889, ibid.: 716.
54. Dôshisha hyakunenshi vol. 1. 1979: 373-375.
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made any school of science worth its name and what stood at its heart was a 
well-equipped laboratory. “I must say frankly,” Shimomura wrote during the 
negotiations for his return, “I cannot teach chemistry if you do not give me a 
chemical laboratory to work in; for I hold any matter of teaching chemistry 
but the laboratory & study method has no educational value whatever.” 55 He 
secured a separate grant from Harris for the purpose of purchasing best available 
German laboratory equipment. 56 But Shimomura’s laboratory teaching dream 
did not last. The opening of the new department coincided with the death of 
Dôshisha’s principal founder and launched the institution into a crisis that 
would engulf Shimomura’s career. After ive years at the head of Dôshisha’s 
School of Science, Shimomura resigned over a conlict with the administrators 
(who were also his childhood friends and fellow Kumamoto bando converts) 
over channeling of the Harris trust fund income towards the operating cost of 
the college preparatory department. Feeling that such a use was a breach of the 
donor’s intent, Shimomura resigned in 1895, leaving the world of academia, 
and was obliged to go into that of industry and applied research.
The making of an engineer (1895-1914): Osaka to Brussels
Personal and family reasons limited Shimomura’s professional mobility, 
focusing his job search on the city of Osaka, a commercial hub and an emerging 
industrial city. 57 Upon leaving Dôshisha, Shimomura became interested in the 
new technology of coking and was able to attract the attention of the Osaka-
based entrepreneur and banker Toyama Shûzô (1862-1916). 58 With the support 
of Matsukata Masayoshi (1835-1924), Japan’s longtime inance minister, 
Toyama undertook the opening of a chemical plant in Osaka, hired Shimomura, 
and sent him abroad for training. 59 Records of Toyama’s initial business plan 
are unclear, but judging by where he chose to send Shimomura, it seems that 
he planned to set up a byproduct coking plant so as to sell coke (perhaps to the 
Osaka Arsenal) while commercializing the byproducts, such as coal gas, coal 
tar, benzene, and/or ammonia. 
55. Shimomura to Niijima, May 20, 1889. See Nijiima Jô eibun shomotsu 2007: 694; 
August 15, 1889, ibid.: 716; emphasis in the original.
56. Shimomura to Niijima, August 15, 1889; and see Shimomura to Niijima, May 20, 
1889. And see Nijiima Jô eibun shomotsu 2007: 694.
57. For English sources on the rise of industrial Osaka, see Sawai 1999 and Mosk 2001.
58. The encounter is briely mentioned in Shimomura 1925: 3
59. Shimao 1991: 199.
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School of Science, Shimomura resigned over a conlict with the administrators 
of Matsukata Masayoshi (1835-1924), Japan’s longtime inance minister, 
 The encounter is briely mentioned in Shimomura 1925: 3
When Shimomura went to Solvay & Cie in Charleroi, Belgium, for 
training in 1897, he found himself at one of the leading chemical companies in 
Europe. 60 This trip was not simply a study trip or an inspection tour, but rather 
a transformative experience for a chemistry professor tasked with reinventing 
himself as a chemical engineer and coking specialist.
Coke is a solid fuel obtained by a process of coking, essentially the heating 
of coal in the absence of air so as to drive off the impurities commonly found in 
coal. There are many complex differences in techniques, but there are basically 
two ways of coking coal: 1) one that makes no provision for the recuperation 
of impurities that are driven off in the process, and 2) one that enables 
recuperation, processes the impurities, and commercializes the byproducts. 61 
Shimomura went to Belgium to train in a company that was one of the pioneers 
of byproduct coking and which, several years before his arrival, became 
conident enough to start expanding its coking operation internationally. 62
Solvay & Cie was established in 1863 by the chemical engineer Ernest 
Solvay (1838-1922), who had earned fame and fortune by patenting a process 
for manufacturing soda ash, an indispensable component in glass production, 
water treatment, and soap making. Cheaper and less polluting than the more 
common Leblanc method for producing soda ash, the Solvay method spread 
rapidly. In 1874, Solvay opened a larger plant in Nancy, France. Up until the 
middle of the 1880s, the Solvay soda ash plants obtained their ammonia from 
local gas plants, an arrangement that occasionally put a stress on supply due to 
transportation dificulties. 63 This fact, along with ever-increasing production 
and concomitant proits made Solvay both interested in and able to invest in 
the research and development of byproduct coking technology.
Interestingly, the principal drive in developing what would become one of 
the most advanced coking technologies of its generation was not a need for 
coke itself but rather a demand for one of the byproducts of coke’s production—
ammonia. Solvay’s idea was to secure his own ammonia supply and offset the 
supply costs in part by the sale of coke to the metallurgical industry. In 1876, 
he gave Louis Semet (1844-1920) the responsibility for devising a technology 
60. For the place of Solvay & Cie in the context of the Belgian chemical industry and for 
a sketch of its early history, see Bertrams 2013; 65-97. For the overall importance of 
Belgium in the global chemical industry, see Haber 1971.
61. For a detailed technical description of both processes in contemporaneous coking 
manuals, see Fulton 1895: 92-229.
62. For detailed description of the technique as it was practiced at the time, see Fulton 
1895, and for a slightly later period, see Dixon 1939.
63. Bertrams 2013: 59.
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mostly valued for its secondary production. Semet, who was Solvay’s cousin 
and brother-in-law, had considerable experience in gas production. He was 
born into the family that owned the Saint-Josse gas plant near Brussels where 
he had begun his career. 64 The prospects of developing an economically viable 
coke oven that would allow recovery of byproducts at a steady rate and at a 
reasonable cost seemed bleak in the late 1870s. A number of such experiments 
had taken place across Europe in the late 1860s, but they consistently failed to 
produced metallurgical grade coke and/or were commercially unviable because 
of high recovery costs. 65 Likely starting with an improved Carves oven as the 
basis, by early 1882 the irst battery consisting of six ovens that would become 
the Semet-Solvay type was built in Mons (40 kilometers west of the original 
Solvay soda plant at Charleroi). 66 A second battery of twenty-ive ovens was 
built in 1886 at the coal mine at Havré, just outside Mons, setting in place 
Solvay’s business model for its coking plants. Typically, Solvay built batteries 
of ovens at its own cost at the customers’facilities. This arrangement beneited 
clients unwilling or unable to invest large sums of money in building and 
operating a coking plant. While the client received the coke that was produced, 
Solvay recuperated its investment by retaining the rights to all the byproducts. 
In 1892, the irst battery of this type of ovens was built overseas, in Syracuse, 
New York, before expanding to Pennsylvania, Alabama, Kentucky, Ohio, 
Michigan, West Virginia, Massachusetts, and locations in Canada.
At present, few records are available on Shimomura’s stay in Belgium, 
but it is certain that once he arrived in Brussels in April 1896, Shimomura 
went through intensive training. In addition to mastering the chemistry and 
physics of coking, he had to learn about how practically to go about setting 
up and operating the coking and recovering the valuable byproducts. His 
training was organized and supervised by William Kirkpatrick, a Solvay 
company engineer who was soon to become one of the two men responsible 
for the Solvay byproduct coking operation. 67 Finally, while based in Brussels, 
64. Ibid.
65. Burn 1961: 204.
66. Designed by François Carves and patented in Britain in 1879 and in the US in 1883, 
the oven was designed as to collect some coal tar and ammonia emitted in the process 
of distillation. See: Speciication forming part of Letters Patent no. 287,905, dated 
November 6, 1883, United States Patent Ofice. Accessible at www.google.com/
patents/US287905.
67. Personnel iles, Archives of the Solvay Corporate Secretariat, Brussels.
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Shimomura traveled to England for the purpose of visiting the machine and 
mining equipment suppliers in Shefield. 68
Shimomura went to Belgium before the Osaka Chemical Works was even 
oficially registered as a company. Upon his return, he was designated as the 
Director, and he was the highest-ranking technical expert at the company; he 
left Japan a former college professor of chemistry and returned as an Engineer-
in-Chief. He soon placed two orders: one for a coal mixing, washing, and 
grinding plant from Shefield, and another for a battery of sixteen Semet-Solvay 
ovens from Brussels. This was an indication of a careful start, since a standard-
size plant would have a battery of an average of 25 ovens. But it was Semet-
Solvay’s irst step into the potentially lucrative Japanese market. If successful, 
the Osaka installation would serve as a model plant, and Shimomura was given 
a monopoly over the sale of Semet-Solvay coke ovens in Japan in the hope that 
the business could expand, particularly to the Mitsui and Mitsubishi mining 
enterprises on the archipelago.
Geology vs technology: high volatile content coal and  
innovations in coking protocol
The Meiji period in Japan was a time of belief not only in the ideology 
of progress but also in the universal applicability (and thus transferability) of 
technology. In the realm of industrial development, progress in late nineteenth–
century Japan seemed to hinge on importing foreign technology for making 
a “rich country, strong army” (fukoku kyôhei). 69 Like numerous examples of 
the impossibility of a simple, mechanical transfer of Western technology to 
Japan, byproduct coking was one of those areas that strongly challenged the 
universalist view of technology reigning among Meiji bureaucrats. This meant 
that purchasing ovens in Belgium and installing them in Japan was not a simple 
question of raising the capital and training or recruiting technical experts. 
Before the ovens could be successfully made to work and the enterprise could 
become proitable, Shimomura had to overcome a major obstacle inherent in 
seeking to combine Japanese coal and Belgian technology. Putting the plant 
into operation was not simply a question of unpacking and assembling the 
equipment according to the blueprints enclosed in the crates and written 
instructions from Brussels. This was mostly due to the fact that the imported 
68. See references in the correspondence with the Hardy Patent Pick Co., Dôshisha 
University Archives, Shimomura Papers, G: Y-SK-6, folder 51.
69. Wittner 2008: 1-18.
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ovens were made to coke a kind of coal very different from the one Shimomura 
wanted to coke. Most European coking coals contained an average of 15% 
to 18% of volatile matter, and no Semet-Solvay coke oven in Europe had to 
coke coal above 22%. 70 Practically all coal in Japan contained between 38% 
and 40% volatile matter. Given that the higher the volatile content in coal, the 
lower the quality of the coke produced from it, this was no small challenge. 
What may have initially seemed to Toyama a simple question of purchasing 
the equipment and shipping it to Japan turned out to involve considerable 
innovation in production protocols and raw material manipulation. This was 
in addition to trying to lower operating costs, secure a stable supply of raw 
materials, and reverse-engineering and improving pieces of equipment to keep 
the production going.
It took Shimomura about two years to start getting hard coke from a mix 
of local bituminous coal (40% to 60% carbon content) and imported anthracite 
coal (90% carbon content). But he could not consider this a success because 
the process still depended on imported coal, albeit less of it. It took several 
more years of experimentation before he was able to develop a protocol for 
obtaining hard coke exclusively from local coal. 71 By 1904, Shimomura had 
devised a procedure that dispensed with the use of imported anthracite coal and 
enabled coking of domestic high volatile – content coke without imported high-
quality coal. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Shimomura’s innovation 
was that it had more to do with the preparatory phase than with the actual 
coking in the ovens. There are two elements that were crucial to the success of 
the procedure: 1) Shimomura’s decision, in preparing coal for coking, to grind 
before washing, and 2) the decision to coke speciic coal mixtures in two steps 
instead of one, as was the norm of the day.
Of the two innovations, the former, namely grinding before washing, was 
the more controversial at the time. Early in the process of setting up the coking 
plant at the Osaka Chemical Works, Shimomura insisted on reversing the usual 
order of preparing coal for coking. He was warned by the Shefield engineers 
from whom he bought coal-washing equipment that it was inadvisable and 
even “suicidal to grind this material before washing.” If he “wish [ed] to be 
successful,” they warned, he “must wash irst and grind afterwards.” They even 
70. Four à Coke Semet-Solvay (1913): 63, Archives of the Solvay Corporate Secretariat, 
Brussels.
71. Letter from Shimomura Kôtarô, Osaka, to William Kirkpatrick, Brussels, September 
16, 1899; Dôshisha University Archives, Shimomura Papers, G: Y-SK-6, folder 51.
of coal too ine to coke, not to mention requiring less time, labor, and water for 
beneit from any method of impurity elimination, no matter how outlandish 
it sounded in Shefield. Grinding coal and thus physically breaking down its 
coal. Although Shimomura’s procedure made getting the inal product a 
1890s and early 1900s due to the strong impulse to self-suficiency driving 
 Letters from Hardy Patent Pick Co., Shefield, to Shimomura Kôtarô, Osaka, September 
 Letter from Hardy Patent Pick Co., Shefield, to Shimomura Kôtarô, Osaka, July 6, 
(Shimomura Process of Low Temperature Carbonisation—Method of Producing 
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before washing, and 2) the decision to coke speciic coal mixtures in two steps 
order of preparing coal for coking. He was warned by the Shefield engineers 
successful,” they warned, he “must wash irst and grind afterwards.” They even 
 Letter from Shimomura Kôtarô, Osaka, to William Kirkpatrick, Brussels, September 
threatened not to send the equipment if he planned to use it in such a way. 72 There 
was good reason for their misgivings about Shimomura’s idea. The mixture of 
different sizes of coal allows a freer passage of water and prevents production 
of coal too ine to coke, not to mention requiring less time, labor, and water for 
the washing. 73 While Shimomura knew all the arguments in favor of washing 
before grinding, he also knew that the kind of coal he wished to coke could 
beneit from any method of impurity elimination, no matter how outlandish 
it sounded in Shefield. Grinding coal and thus physically breaking down its 
structure was a way to disrupt the impurities as well and literally try to wash 
some of them away before coking. In terms of labor hours and water use (and 
waste water created in the process), this was not the optimal way of preparing 
the coal for coking. But in terms of the geological equation Shimomura had to 
solve, it was perhaps one of the best solutions given his constraints (the poor 
quality of the coal) on the one hand and available resources on the other (the 
availability of water and relatively low costs of unskilled labor).
The second innovation, known and later patented as the Shimomura 
Procedure, was a protocol for mixing coal with semi-coke or X-coal, as 
Shimomura called it, instead of the commonly used anthracite. The principle 
of the process consisted in coking high volatile coals at 400° to 600°C, thus 
obtaining X-Coal, mixing it with high volatile coal in a proportion ranging 
from 15% to 40%, and then proceeding to coke that in the usual way. 74 The 
advantage of using semi-coke was that it could be produced by coking highly 
bituminous Japanese coal and could substitute for the imported anthracite 
coal. Although Shimomura’s procedure made getting the inal product a 
longer, two-step operation, its importance lay in that it was a technology that 
was operational solely using natural resources available on the archipelago 
itself, if necessary. This was of particular symbolic importance in the late 
1890s and early 1900s due to the strong impulse to self-suficiency driving 
the second wave of Japan’s industrialization. 75 Therefore, technologies such 
72. Letters from Hardy Patent Pick Co., Shefield, to Shimomura Kôtarô, Osaka, September 
1, 1898, and September 6, 1898; Dôshisha University Archives, Shimomura Papers, 
RG: Y-SK-6, folder 53.
73. Letter from Hardy Patent Pick Co., Shefield, to Shimomura Kôtarô, Osaka, July 6, 
1897; Dôshisha University Archives, Shimomura Papers, folder 53.
74. Shimomura, Kôtarô. Shimomurashi sekitan teionkanryûhô—yûryô gaitan wo seizô 
(Shimomura Process of Low Temperature Carbonisation—Method of Producing 
Superior Coke). Dôshisha University Archives, Shimomura Papers, pamphlet, 
uncatalogued material, box 7 of 21.
75. The rough periodization of Japanese industrialization in four phases—1868-1912 
(beginnings), 1912-1945 (rapid growth, further stimulated by the war effort between 
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as Shimomura’s were as much appreciated as they were rare; they were both 
homegrown and reliant on locally available raw materials. 76 At a political 
moment when the supply of raw materials (coal and iron ore) was far from 
secure and stable, this technology held a promise of energy self-suficiency, 
albeit an economically and environmentally costly one.
The making of an industry
Similar to Ernest Solvay’s interest in innovation in coking technology, 
a large part of Toyama’s incentive for setting up his Osaka plant lay in the 
commercialization of the byproducts. The production of coke was a long-
term goal, and devising a way of reaching it was made possible by the proits 
from the sale of byproducts. Thus Shimomura’s principal job was increasing 
recuperation rates to enable the inancial viability of the enterprise and allow 
him to pursue his interest in coke. It was his goal to produce metallurgical-grade 
coke without having to use imported coal that would become the trademark 
of his early career at Osaka Gas (1897-1905). In 1905, the combination of 
these two lines of work—byproducts and coke—brought him to the attention 
of General Nakamura Yûjiro (1852-1928), the head of the deeply-troubled 
government-run iron and steel venture, the Yawata Steel Works (Yawata 
seitetsujô). 77
1937 and 1945), 1945-1970s (economic recovery), and 1980 to the present (period of 
de-industrialization)— is widely assumed to be axiomatic. See, for example, Gerteis 
2013. There is still no consensus on the sub-periodization of Meiji industrialization 
(1868-1912). My use of the term “second wave” is an adaptation of Mosk’s “second 
long wave.” It refers to the period in which a capital-intensive massive industrial 
upswing, especially in the heavy-manufacturing sector, took place, becoming 
subsequently the driver of the Japan’s economic growth in the 1910s.
76. This is evident not only from the fact that it was patented in Japan, but also by the fact 
of its longevity. It features prominently in US occupation – period reports on Japanese 
industrial capacity written half a century later. Unfortunately, data on sales of the 
patent are unavailable for this period. For an example of treatment of the Shimomura 
Procedure in the US occupation – period reports, see General Headquarters Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, Natural Resources Section, Low Temperature 
Carbonization of Coal in Japan, Report no. 74, April 16, 1947; Dôshisha University 
Archive, uncatalogued material, box 3 of 21.
77. Yawata is the placename for the plant’s location; seitetsujô literally means “iron-
manufacturing place.” The company name was commonly translated to English as 
either Yawata Steel or Yawata Steel Works and more rarely Yawata Iron and Steel 
Works. The rendering of the character tetsu as steel in this case is not a vestige of poor 
can be documented beginning in the inal decades of the Tokugawa period 
of urgency and inlux of capital from war indemnities enabled the launch of a 
The implications for the plant proved signiicant. Noro’s initial plan 
changed both the scale and the speciications of the equipment. With the 
made solution for Japan’s irst iron and steel mill. While Noro’s speciications 
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secure and stable, this technology held a promise of energy self-suficiency, 
term goal, and devising a way of reaching it was made possible by the proits 
recuperation rates to enable the inancial viability of the enterprise and allow 
While small-scale efforts to modernize iron and steel production in Japan 
can be documented beginning in the inal decades of the Tokugawa period 
(1600-1868), it was only after the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) that the sense 
of urgency and inlux of capital from war indemnities enabled the launch of a 
sustained effort in that direction. By the provisions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
(known in China as the Treaty of Maguan), the Qing Empire was to pay to 
Japan a sum of 200 million taels of silver (some 7,400 tons) as war indemnities. 
This sizable capital (amounting to 2.3 times the annual expenditures of Japan) 
enabled the allocation of 4 million yen for the building of a government-owned 
iron and steel plant. 78 The estimate was based on an earlier proposal by Noro 
Kageyoshi (1854-1923), a metallurgy professor at the Imperial University of 
Tokyo, with a goal of the annual production of some 60,000 tons of steel. 
Between the approval by the Diet in 1895 and that establishment of Yawata 
as a legal entity a year later, however, Noro was implicated in a scandal that 
resulted in his being stripped of all public functions, including the advisory one 
in Yawata project. 79
The implications for the plant proved signiicant. Noro’s initial plan 
included a mix-and-match of equipment from different suppliers, including 
two Bessemer converters, four Siemens Martin open furnaces, six puddlers 
and one crucible furnace. His successor, Ôshima Michitarô (1860-1921), 
changed both the scale and the speciications of the equipment. With the 
backing of his father’s reputation as Japan’s pioneering metallurgist and his 
own credentials as a German-educated metallurgist, Ôshima was given a free 
hand in choosing Yawata’s technological partner. His choice fell on a single 
company—Gutehoffnungshütte A.G. (GHH)—that was to provide a ready-
made solution for Japan’s irst iron and steel mill. While Noro’s speciications 
were home-grown and involved starting a small plant before expanding it, 
Ôshima’s idea was to leave the design and installation largely in the hands of 
the GHH engineers, doubling the size of the original plant, and hiring a team 
of German engineers and foremen to lead the installation. For a number of 
reasons, the cooperation between Japanese and German engineers and workers 
was less than amicable. Just to what extent things went sour is clear from the 
understanding of the ferrous metals typology. Rather, the character tetsu is used to 
signify ferrous metals as a family of materials. Thus, in the metallurgical terminology 
of the time it was used in compounds such as kôtetsu (steel), chûtetsu (cast iron), or 
rentetsu (wrought iron).
78. Yonekura 1994: 37.




fact that the majority of the Germans, including the Chief Engineer, Gustav 
Toppe, were dismissed before the end of their contracts, and one of the dozen 
Germans disappeared under what seemed to be mysterious circumstances. 80 
By the time of the irst blow-in, in February 1901, only three German workers 
remained onsite.
Since the operation was an integrated iron and steel – making plant, its steel 
production was done in two steps. First the oxygen was removed from the iron 
ore in a blast furnace (iron ore reduction) turning it into molten pig iron. Poured 
out of the blast furnace, pig iron was then oxidized to remove a large portion of 
the carbon, thus making it into steel. In November 1901, the Imperial Yawata 
Steel Works were inaugurated in a solemn ceremony. But despite the initial 
enthusiasm, igniting the furnace was far easier than keeping it in continuous 
operation. Despite its high-end design, the furnace was considered to have 
performed poorly because the pig iron coming out of it was not suitable for 
steel production. While the quality of iron ore had something to do with the 
poor results, Noro concluded that one of the major problems was the poor 
quality of the coke used in smelting. 81 One of most damaging technological 
consequences of the use of substandard fuel was that it was unlikely to produce 
temperatures high enough to yield a molten pig-iron mass. As a consequence, 
instead of lowing out of the oven in a molten state, heated iron lumps would 
harden on the walls of the blast furnace. This meant a complete interruption 
of the production, cooling down of the oven, and replacement of the blocked 
pipes and lower parts of the oven—a long and costly process.
Newly-found documentary evidence dating from 1898 shows that long 
before the coke became a major cause of a halt in production in 1902, Yawata 
engineers were well aware of the gravity of the problem. 82 Yet they were 
unable to bring their point across so that the allocations would be made to 
build a top-of-the-line coking plant to go along the high-end blast furnaces. 
Instead, until 1905, Yawata kept focusing on improving the design of the blast 
furnaces and neglecting the coking facilities, entering a vicious circle of bad 
80. For a seminal study of German inluence on early Yawata technology and a Japanese 
translation of German documents pertaining to this period, see Fukuokakenshi 1995 
and 1998. For a summary see Mathias & Pauer 2004: 730-746.
81. Noro 1915: vol. 1, no. 8, 845-857 and vol. 1, no. 10, 1125-1138.
82. The private archive of Shimomura Kôtarô, discovered during my dissertation research 
in 2009, contains references to the 1898-1899 negotiations between Yawata Steel 
Works and Osaka Gas regarding the setting-up of a coking plant. These negotiations 
have previously gone unmentioned in any company history or analysis of the coke 
problem at Yawata.
to help with the revival efforts. Although he clearly identiied the lack of good-
that ield was limited. While he was able to improve the design of the irst blast 
good coke, the second blast furnace would share the fate of the irst, Nakamura 
suspicious, igure for at least two reasons. First, he was very different from other 
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By the time of the irst blow-in, in February 1901, only three German workers 
instead of lowing out of the oven in a molten state, heated iron lumps would 
 For a seminal study of German inluence on early Yawata technology and a Japanese 
coke causing damage to the furnaces and more money going to their repair 
instead of addressing the root cause of the damage.
After production came to a standstill in April, 1902, General Nakamura was 
appointed Yawata’s new director, and the beginning of his tenure was marked 
by a series of drastic measures that included the suspension of all attempts to 
blow-in the blast furnace, dismissal of the majority of employees, including 
top management personnel Chief Engineer Ôshima and W. Neuhauser, one 
of the two German foremen at the blast furnace, two years before the end of 
his contract. This meant that Noro’s student Hattori Susumu (1865-1940) and 
seven German foremen were left to restart the production and build a second 
blast furnace. Shortly after, with the scandal that had cost him his position 
several years earlier largely forgotten, Noro Kageyoshi was brought to Yawata 
to help with the revival efforts. Although he clearly identiied the lack of good-
quality coke as a major technical reason for Yawata’s crisis, his experience in 
that ield was limited. While he was able to improve the design of the irst blast 
furnace and help Hattori to build the second blast furnace with minimal help 
from two German foremen, he was unable to offer a practical solution to the 
coke problem.
By March 1904, Japan was at war with Russia, a major military engagement, 
and the second blast furnace at Yawata was ready for blow-in, but the existing 
in-house coking facilities were still performing poorly. Aware that without 
good coke, the second blast furnace would share the fate of the irst, Nakamura 
embarked on an inspection of coking facilities in the country. In early 1904, 
during a visit to the Osaka Chemical Works, he met Shimomura, a man 
who seemed capable of helping Yawata. Nakamura had good reasons to be 
interested in Shimomura as much as to be suspicious of him. On the one hand, 
by this time Shimomura had the experience—unique in Japan—of setting up 
and running a byproduct coking plant. Not only could he set up a production 
protocol for obtaining blast-furnace grade coke, but he could also help Yawata 
collect and commercialize coal tar, one of the byproducts of coking and an 
indispensable ingredient for much-needed coal briquettes used as naval fuel. 83
However, Shimomura must have struck Nakamura as an odd, if not 
suspicious, igure for at least two reasons. First, he was very different from other 
engineers Nakamura interacted with at Yawata or those he would later meet in 
Manchuria. During Nakamura’s time at Yawata, virtually all the engineers for 
whom data is available were graduates of the University of Tokyo’s Science 
Department, the Kôbudaigakkô (the College of Engineering and Technology), 
today’s Faculty of Engineering, which was founded in 1877. Those who, like 
83. Evans and Peattie 1997: 66.
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Noro, graduated in the 1880s had studied under the Kôbudaigakkô’s foreign 
experts, who had been hired to teach and train future Japanese faculty, and 
they often logged years of study abroad. Noro himself spent seven years 
studying mechanical and electrical engineering at the University of London 
and metallurgy at Freiberg University of Mining and Technology in Germany. 
The following generation, represented at Yawata by Hattori Susumu, the head 
of the blast furnace division at the time of the coke crisis, was less likely to 
have been abroad and more likely to come to Yawata straight from their Tokyo 
classrooms. Shimomura was not a graduate of the University of Tokyo nor was 
he connected to it in any way. Seven years younger than Noro, Shimomura 
had a proile and career with little in common with Noro’s or with that of most 
Yawata engineers; he was in many ways an outsider.
Second, Shimomura was very likely the only practicing Protestant Christian 
with whom Nakamura dealt professionally, since Christians were virtually 
absent from high Army echelons. At the time the two met, Shimomura was 
the president of his alma mater, Dôshisha, a church member, and the leading 
pastor of the college’s congregation. In the late-Meiji mindset, Christians 
could hardly be patriots since their loyalties were suspect. According to the 
stereotypical view, they bowed to Jesus instead of the emperor and had perhaps 
too close ties with foreigners. In today’s vocabulary, one might say that, from 
Nakamura’s perspective, Shimomura was not the ideal candidate for a security 
clearance and full access to one of the country’s major military facilities. 
Yet it was precisely Shimomura’s identity and itinerary as an outsider to the 
nation’s science and technology mainstream that facilitated his acquisition of 
the technological know-how that would turn out to be game-changing for the 
Imperial Steel Works and propel Nakamura’s career. This acknowledgement 
that he gained as the man who brought Yawata from ruin to proitability would 
contribute to his future political career. In 1914, when Yawata was proitable, 
Nakamura was appointed Director of the South Manchurian Railroad (a 
conglomerate that coordinated Japanese penetration into Manchuria) which 
was a major promotion and a stepping-stone into big-league politics.
Shimomura’s expertise outweighed Nakamura’s possible suspicions, and in 
1905 Shimomura helped put in an order for 75 coke ovens for Yawata. In 1906 
he made several trips to Kyûshû to install the ovens and train the engineers 
and foremen in operating them. The irst half of the total of 150 ovens was 
installed in November 1906, while the rest were put in operation between 1907 
and 1909. As noted above, the key element in coking local coal and getting 
metallurgical-grade coke lay not in learning how to use the ovens themselves 
but in mastering the art of preparing and mixing the coal. One of Shimomura’s 
brightest students was the young Kuroda Taizô (1883-1961). Born in Osaka, 
operating, Yawata had inally obtained the coke it needed to start eficient 
registered its irst proits, and Shimomura, uninterested in moving to Yawata, 
eyesight. The explosion took place just as Japan was heading into a conlict 
would lead to Japan’s entry into what was becoming a major global conlict.
one signiicant implication: imports of dyestuffs were going to be interrupted 
to reproduce an experiment he noted during his time at Johns Hopkins, ifteen 
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studying mechanical and electrical engineering at the University of London 
had a proile and career with little in common with Noro’s or with that of most 
that he gained as the man who brought Yawata from ruin to proitability would 
contribute to his future political career. In 1914, when Yawata was proitable, 
and foremen in operating them. The irst half of the total of 150 ovens was 
twenty-two years old and only half of Shimomura’s age at the time, he was a 
recent graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo’s School of Engineering. 
Hired a few months before Shimomura was brought to consult at Yawata, he 
was seemingly a fast learner and soon became Yawata’s foremost coke expert. 84
With Shimomura’s procedure in place and the Semet-Solvay ovens 
operating, Yawata had inally obtained the coke it needed to start eficient 
operation. A year after the planned coking plant was installed in 1909, Yawata 
registered its irst proits, and Shimomura, uninterested in moving to Yawata, 
could return to his research in byproduct chemistry. On the evening of August 
14, 1914, however, there was an explosion in his private laboratory in Kyoto, 
and Shimomura suffered burns to his hands and face, severely damaging his 
eyesight. The explosion took place just as Japan was heading into a conlict 
against Germany. Only a few hours before Shimomura went into his laboratory 
on that evening, Japan had issued an ultimatum to Germany to remove all its 
soldiers and armed vessels from Japanese waters and to deliver to Japanese 
authorities the Kiaochau concession (Jiaozhou Bay), a recently acquired 
552 km2 German foothold in northern China. Most agreed that this ultimatum 
would lead to Japan’s entry into what was becoming a major global conlict.
For a Japanese chemist like Shimomura, impending war with Germany had 
one signiicant implication: imports of dyestuffs were going to be interrupted 
at the time when 90% of synthetic dyes used in textile and related industries 
were imported from Germany. As a chemist, Shimomura was well aware that 
war with Germany would thus mean an interrupted supply of synthetic dyes 
from Germany and “a dyestuff famine.” 85 Synthetic dyestuff were an essential 
component of Japan’s textile industry, the country’s premier export. Thus, the 
Japanese ultimatum would mean an economic crisis by practically halting 
textile exports. Shimomura went into his private laboratory that Sunday to try 
to reproduce an experiment he noted during his time at Johns Hopkins, ifteen 
years before, and which he hoped could help to synthesize a black dye. 86 It 
was during this attempt that an explosion took place. Although his eyesight 
partially recovered and he was able to continue his career as the Managing 
Director of the Osaka Chemical Works, the accident forced his research career 
into quieter waters. He continued being an important player in the chemical 
industry while occupying positions at the Japanese Dyestuff Company and 
the Japanese Wood-preservation Company. He also went on to publish a 
84. Kuroda 1912.
85. Hashimoto 2007: 36.
86. Shimomura, Kôgyô rireki.
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collection of poems, a book of philosophical relections on the human soul, 
and an autobiography.
Conclusion
From the outline of his personal and professional itinerary, it is clear that 
as a chemical engineer Shimomura was both exceptional and marginal. At 
the same time, Shimomura’s life, travels, and work are of interest precisely 
because they can help add nuance to our understanding of the emergence of 
the engineering profession, the public-private cooperation in late-Meiji heavy 
industry, and the place of technological innovation in the study of Japanese 
industrialization. 87
In existing studies on the emergence of the speciic category of an engineer, 
careful attention has been given to the dificulty of studying the subject due to a 
confusion in terminology used. In particular, the term “engineer” or gishi rarely 
appears in company records until 1905. When it does, it can igure as a category 
in civil-service ranking and not necessarily designate a person with technical 
qualiications. Thus, analyses hinge on the close examination of a number 
of generic terms, such as shokutaku, joshu, yatoi, or gitei, used to designate 
a person whose job description requires some level of technical training. 
Regardless of the terms used, current consensus is that most technicians were 
trained on the job or in technical schools organized in connection with large 
industrial complexes. 88 A minority of technically-trained men and a majority 
of those we could comfortably call engineers had diplomas from the Imperial 
Universities. I would like to suggest that Shimomura’s career and itinerary 
reveals a need to broaden this typology and that there may have been different 
kinds of engineers, notably those trained at a high level but outside the Imperial 
University network, who worked toward Meiji industrial development. This 
opens the question of whether, although less visible in the archives, engineers 
educated at small private colleges and/or trained abroad may have been just as 
creative and productive as their counterparts trained in Tokyo, and later Kyoto.
This leads to the second important question that Shimomura’s career raises. 
Up until the 1990s, small and medium-size companies were considered as a 
residue or vestiges of the feudal economy. With the pioneering work of economists 
such as Sawai Minoru and Suzuki Jun, small and middle-size enterprises 
87. See, among others, Pauer 2013, Sawai 2012, Sawai 1998, Odaka and Sawai 1999, and 
Suzuki 1996.
88. For example, see Uchida 1974; Fukasaku 1992: 57-78; and Sawai 2012.
its rules in Brussels as it did on his iguring out a way to adapt those same 
rules in order to accommodate a local coniguration of resources. In that, the 
attempt to coke Japanese coal in the Semet-Solvay ovens, unsucessful at irst 
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collection of poems, a book of philosophical relections on the human soul, 
In existing studies on the emergence of the speciic category of an engineer, 
careful attention has been given to the dificulty of studying the subject due to a 
appears in company records until 1905. When it does, it can igure as a category 
qualiications. Thus, analyses hinge on the close examination of a number 
emerged as active and important elements of Japanese industrialization, the 
spiritus movens of a dynamic private sector. 89 Regardless of its aspirations and 
later development, during the late Meiji period, Osaka Chemical Works was 
one of those medium-size companies. What Shimomura’s itinerary reveals is 
that not only were small and medium-size companies important ingredients 
of economic growth but that they were also important sites of technological 
innovation. This is not a point of minor importance. In theory, knowledge of 
the latest development in byproduct coking existed at both Osaka Chemical 
Works and at Yawata. In practice, it was the much smaller Osaka Chemical 
Works that invested in bringing the technology to Japan and building expertise. 
This required adapting the technology to the local raw materials—a complex, 
expensive and lengthy project. Once Shimomura developed a coking protocol 
that enabled the use of Semet-Solvay ovens with local Kyûshû coal in a 
medium-size, private venture, the state-run Yawata Steel Works absorbed the 
technology, albeit with next to no acknowledgement of either Shimomura’s 
role or that of the Osaka Chemical Works. I would like to suggest that this 
episode opens the question of the role of small and medium-size companies in 
technological innovation, as distinct from the overall economic growth, that 
characterized Meiji industrialization.
Finally, Shimomura’s innovations are an excellent example of the 
changes that technical knowledge undergoes in the process of circulation. 
His career shows that the notion of technology transfer conceived of merely 
as a mechanical transplantation from place A to place B is simplistic. The 
circulation of technological expertise does not simply rely on reproduction but 
depends in great measure on innovation. Shimomura’s effort to bring byproduct 
coking technology from Belgium to Japan depended as much on him learning 
its rules in Brussels as it did on his iguring out a way to adapt those same 
rules in order to accommodate a local coniguration of resources. In that, the 
attempt to coke Japanese coal in the Semet-Solvay ovens, unsucessful at irst 
because the ovens were designed to coke a different kind of coal, is not very 
different, for example, from the failure of a French-made Gasogen device to 
function in Costa Rica because it was fed a different kind of wood. 90 This story 
suggests that in Meiji Japan, too, complex technological systems could not be 
simply plugged in but had to be redesigned before they could even begin to 
be reasonably workable. This in turn suggests that, upon closer inspection, the 
importation of technology in Japan, as elsewhere, has been coupled with more 
innovation than Meiji oligarchs and bureaucratcs would lead us to believe.
89. See Sawai 1998, Odaka and Sawai 1999, and Suzuki 1996.
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